Review: Miriam Solomon, Making Medical Knowledge, Oxford University Press, 2015
Robin Downie has distinguished between two enduring cognitive and practical attitudes that have determined the way that doctors and societies thought about medicine (Downie 2012) . The Hippocratic tradition attached its faith to empirical observation and rational induction and deduction, while the Asklepian approach was holistic, intuitive and strongly spiritual. Hippocrates sought to generalize from individual observations, to generate rules and guidelines from pooled experience. Asklepian physicians believed that cure lay in understanding the personal experience of each patient, and in providing an ambience of healing centered on temples and sacred ground. Hippocratic medicine emphasized the empirical imperative for medicine's epistemology. The Asklepian tradition stressed the humanistic and hermeneutic components of healing.
These two strands have repeatedly parted and intertwined since we have records of medicine as a discipline. And it still happens, as Miriam Solomon vividly reminds us in her recent book Making Medical Knowledge. Solomon sets the tone of her analysis early when she writes "Since the 1960s . . . book reviews -web content only [ e-11 ] web content only the imprecise, messy, and non-logical (such as analogical and narrative) characteristics of all scientific methods, have been much better appreciated, at least by philosophers of science and others working in science studies" (3). She goes on to examine four discourses that have developed in 20 th and 21 st century medicine as modes of justifying epistemic activities in medical thought and practice-consensus conferences; evidence-based medicine; translational medicine; and what she calls 'narrative medicine,' which includes all the humanistic practices such as patient-centred medicine, person-centred medicine, mindful practice, values-based medicine, and so on. Her premise is that each of these discourses has something obvious about it and something odd. Consensus medicine is rational in the social epistemic sense, but not in a pragmatic sense because it seems unlikely that 20 experts can reach agreement on the 'right' answer in a few days. Evidence based medicine is eminently logical, but is restrained in its acceptance of what counts as 'good' evidence. Translational medicine is conventional in encouraging trial and error and allowing causal reasoning, unconventional because it plays down the centrality of controlled clinical trials. Narrative medicine is obviously good where it promotes sensitive interpretation of individual patient stories, odd because its main usefulness comes from making generalisations from the stories.
Solomon has written widely on social epistemology in the past, and she reviews very thoroughly the history of consensus conferences. (The review extends to 80 pages of 229 pages of text. Some may find this disproportionately long and detailed.) The data she provides is thorough, and reflects her long interest in consensus. Conferences can be held to address technical or "interface" issues, the latter referring to recommendations for practice. She distinguishes between an NIH model and a Danish model, where the Danish model includes non-experts on the panel, but she points to the general shortcomings of any consensus model. Time constraints, shortfalls in evidence, compromises that have to be negotiated, and the lack of imperative attached to the issued statements and guidelines have all meant that impacts on practice have been relatively small.
Solomon makes two further important points about consensus conferences. First, the bodies responsible for organising and running them have been disbanded in the US and some European countries. Second, they still happen, even without government endorsement. Meetings of experts are still convened when controversial matters arise-such as the value of screening for prostate cancer or for breast cancer between the kennedy institute of ethics journal • march 2016 [ e-12 ] web content only ages of 40 and 49 years. Debate about these screening procedures still persists. So while consensus-seeking still goes on, it becomes clearer that the conferences are not good at resolving the really difficult issues, in which beliefs, values, and interpretations clash over the interpretation and meaning of evidence. How does one reach consensus when one party claims that a single life saved by screening makes the program worthwhile, while the other says that the financial and human costs of false positives make the program unsustainable? Solomon points out that consensus conferences may help to standardize medical practices, but may also simply highlight stand-offs between proponents of essentially contested concepts.
Consensus, however, cannot be dismissed from the epistemic field. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) was conceived as a way to elevate evidence, obtained in very particular ways, to the status of automatic consensus maker. Bring the 'right' evidence, especially from randomized controlled trials or meta-analyses, to the table, and everyone must agree to the objective findings and follow evidence-based practices and guidelines. There is no doubt that EBM has had a lasting effect on medical epistemology. Of course, medicine has used evidence for centuries. EBM, however, introduced the notion of a hierarchy of evidence, with controlled trials and meta-analyses at the top, observational studies and uncontrolled trials below, and expert opinion at the bottom. The lowly place of expert opinion reflected badly on consensus conferences of experts, and replaced expertise with approved evidence. Reasoning from mechanisms has been regarded with great suspicion by champions of EBM, who have argued relentlessly for empiricism as the justification for medical knowledge and practice. A belief or intervention is justified if and only if it can be shown by the highest possible evidence to be a better bet than prevailing treatments or to no treatment.
Solomon deals with the objections to EBM in a sophisticated and thorough way. Under the heading of Internal Validity, she deals with problems of bias, even in the RCT, and problems in the generalisation of results to broader populations than the one represented by each trial. She examines the case for the value of observational trials with historical controls. Under External Validity, she deals with the incompleteness of background knowledge, the scrappy knowledge that we have of context, and with the intrinsic biological variability of human beings that makes EBM results applicable to populations rather than to individuals. Finally she cites evidence that finds that attempts to reproduce influential RCTs only confirmed the original results in 44% of instances; in 16%, results book reviews -web content only [ e-13 ] web content only were contradicted, and in another 16% effects were less than those claimed in the original papers; the remaining 24% went unchallenged and unreplicated.
Translational medicine is offered by its proponents as the next epistemological step beyond EBM, putting forward an epistemology that is at once more clearly situated in the realities of clinical practice and more respectful of mechanistic reasoning. Translational medicine, that is, can begin with considering the basic science and the physiology of a medical problem, and proceed by logical inference to likely solutions. Proposed solutions can then be tried. If they fail, the process is repeated using other likely solutions. Translational processes of this kind (T1) operate at the level of 'bench to bedside', and back again from bedside to bench in an iterative process that acknowledges the necessity for both trial and error. Trials that work in this process can then be further extrapolated, and translated into recommendations for widespread use ('bedside to community' or T2).
Translational medicine depends on finding ways to begin developments in laboratories, and is likely to be highly dependent on biomarkers that can be handled on the bench, and that at the same time allow reasonable predictions to be made about in vivo results. The ultimate problem for translational medicine is to find a reproducible set of methods that will allow for laboratory findings to be expressed in therapeutic terms. More attention seems to be focussed on laying down these ground rules now that the genomic revolution has lost impetus in the wake of failures (as with cystic fibrosis) and unpleasant (even fatal in a case of ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency) side effects.
All these frameworks-consensus, EBM, and translational-express the desire for greater objectivity in justification for medical treatments and protocols, and they fall broadly under the empirical or Hippocratic banner. What Solomon calls 'narrative medicine' seeks its justification in the individual and joint experiences of patients, families, social groups, and doctors. It refers to all the varieties of humanistic medicine-such as the narrative medicine espoused by Charon, mindful practice, patientcentred medicine, empathic care, reflective practice, values-based medicine, and person-centred medicine-and that is not an exhaustive list. What these 'medicines' and 'practices' have in common is their receptiveness to individual accounts of illness, and the ability to interpret the accounts so as to give meaning to them. Each illness narrative, they stress, is unique and good practice dictates that practitioners develop skills in literary analysis, kennedy institute of ethics journal • march 2016 [ e-14 ] web content only so that they can understand what patients and their supporters are actually seeking. This is the contemporary expression of the Asklepian tradition.
Narrative medicine in no way denies the importance of evidence. It simply stresses the individuality of each sufferer and the uniqueness of her suffering. When an evidence-based diagnosis has been reached, the narrative physician still has the task of making the choice of appropriate treatment, tailored to the individual with the diagnosis. It would be hard to object to this construal of NBM. Most patients seek understanding and respect from their treating clinician. But there are clearly epistemic and practical problems with a medicine that is primarily based on narrative. Narratives can be misrepresented by memories and contingencies such as desire for compensation or sympathy. Narrative medicine centralizes the dyadic doctor-patient relationship at a time when team management is becoming more important and more necessary. The singularity of narratives discourages the more general conclusions that are shared between different people's accounts of their illnesses, and which are useful to clinicians.
And so, in the end, Solomon sees no unitary methodology that will ensure progress in medical science or practice. What she suggests is that we are embedded in "a developing, untidy, methodological pluralism" (206-224). Because we still employ consensus meetings, EBM, translational, and narrative medicines as frameworks for advancing knowledge, the methodology of medical science is pluralistic. Furthermore, as the disputes about breast screening in women 40-49 years of age, and the frustrations of developing genetic therapies for cystic fibrosis have shown, each methodology may produce different, apparently warranted conclusions to the others. Perhaps 'personalized medicine,' with its promises of individualized therapy for each and every patient may be the next candidate for primacy of methodology. But Solomon is skeptical, and concludes with this warning: I am not yet convinced that there is enough in the way of new methods, or even reclaimed old methods, to consider personalized medicine as a new way of doing medical research and/or practice. Perhaps such methods will come in due course. Personalized medicine is rhetorically successful, bringing cutting-edge genomic science together with rhetoric of individualized care, but it remains to be seen what substance lies behind the rhetoric. (228) Solomon's book is not an easy read. It is densely argued and documented, it demands attention, and preferably some background knowledge. But it is erudite, informative, provocative, and repays with interest engagement book reviews -web content only [ e-15 ] web content only with its clearly written text and the author's long experience with medical and scientific epistemology. It is a superlative reference for anyone seeking to find out about modern medical epistemology. Philosophers of medicine and science, sociologists, and historians of medicine will find it of particular value.
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